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Introduction 
 Two, quite different intellectual traditions exist concerning cost-benefit analysis (CBA). 
One view, dominant in the United States, sees CBA as a way to identify projects that pass a 
Kaldor-Hicks compensation test and advocates summing unweighted compensating or equivalent 
variations. Another approach, influential in the U.K. and Europe, sees the “social welfare 
function” (SWF) as the fundamental basis for policymaking.1 CBA can generally mimic the 
effect of a SWF if compensating or equivalent variations are multiplied by distributive weights 
that reflect the declining marginal utility of wealth and also, perhaps, social inequality aversion. 
 Scholarship regarding the “value per statistical life” (VSL) has, almost invariably, taken 
the Kaldor-Hicks approach. VSL is the marginal rate of substitution between fatality risk in a 
specified time period, and wealth. In other words, it is the (distributively unweighted) change in 
an individual’s wealth required to compensate him for a small change in his risk of dying during 
the period, divided by the risk change.  
 The social value of mortality risk-reduction presumably depends on our moral 
assumptions about risk and equity. American law (Executive Orders 12866 and 13563) instructs 
regulatory agencies to be sensitive to equity. The Institute of Medicine (2006) recommends that 
“The regulatory decision-making process should explicitly address and incorporate the 
distributional, ethical, and other implications of a proposed intervention along with the quantified 
results of [benefit-cost analysis] and [cost-effectiveness analysis].” Yet VSL has properties that 
can yield what are often viewed as inequitable evaluations of policy change. In particular, VSL 
does not value reductions in mortality risk equally. In some dimensions it favors those who are 
better off (e.g., individuals with higher wealth). In other dimensions, it favors the less well-off 
(e.g., individuals at higher risk of dying). But how does VSL generally compare with other 
frameworks? 
 This article formally examines the social value of mortality risk-reduction through the 
lens of a SWF. It asks: to what extent are the properties of VSL characteristic of various welfarist 
frameworks? If one views some of the implications of using VSL to value risk policies as 
inequitable, is there an SWF that exhibits a more attractive set of implications? In short, what 
happens if we shift from distributively unweighted CBA to some SWF as the societal tool for 
evaluating risk reductions? 
 Part I reviews the SWF approach. As recent scholarship has demonstrated, how to apply 
an SWF under uncertainty is an interesting and difficult problem. There are a wide range of 
possibilities, each with axiomatic advantages and disadvantages.  
                                                 
1To be sure, the concept of the SWF is hardly absent from scholarly discourse in the U.S. For example, it plays a 
central role in scholarship regarding optimal taxation. See, e.g., Kaplow (2008). However, it has been largely absent 
from U.S. scholarship and governmental practice regarding CBA. 
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 Part II discusses how three, commonly discussed “benchmark” SWFs evaluate risk 
reduction—comparing them with each other, and with conventional CBA using VSL. The three 
benchmarks are: a utilitarian SWF, an “ex post” prioritarian (additively separable and strictly 
concave) SWF; and an “ex ante” prioritarian SWF. Given the absence of consensus about how to 
evaluate social situations involving risk (Fleurbaey 2010), we do not intend to be normative. 
Instead, we adopt a descriptive approach and examine whether these standard frameworks 
display five properties that have attracted interest in the economic and risk policy literature:  
(1) Wealth sensitivity: Does the social value of risk reduction—as calculated by CBA or by the 
benchmark SWFs—increase with individual wealth? As is well known, VSL increases with 
wealth but cross-sectional differences in VSL attributable to wealth are virtually always 
suppressed in policy evaluation. Public /political resistance to differentiating VSL by wealth is so 
strong that use of a different (higher) VSL was rejected in a context where both the costs and 
benefits of regulation would fall on an identified higher-income group (airline passengers; 
Viscusi 2009). In contrast, increases in VSL attributable to future income growth are often 
incorporated in analyses (Robinson 2007). As we shall see, the social value of risk reduction 
increases with wealth for CBA and for the utilitarian SWF. By contrast, the ex ante and ex post 
prioritarian SWFs need not be positively sensitive to individual wealth in valuing risk reduction.  
(2) Sensitivity to baseline risk. Does the social value of risk reduction depend on the individual’s 
baseline risk of dying? This property, the “dead-anyway effect” (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1996) is 
not only of intrinsic interest, but is closely connected to the problem of statistical versus 
identified lives (Hammitt and Treich 2007) and to the “rule of rescue,” a moral imperative for 
lifesaving decision makers to give priority to high-risk people (Jonsen 1986). We note however 
that it has been recommended in some policy circles to not adjust the value of lifesaving 
programs for the health status of the affected population (European Commission 2001). The 
social value of risk reduction increases with baseline risk for CBA and the ex ante prioritarian 
SWF, but is independent of baseline risk for the utilitarian and ex post prioritarian SWFs.  
(3) Equal value of risk reduction. This property requires insensitivity to both wealth and baseline 
risk, as well as to other factors such as age and health. The nearly ubiquitous use of a common 
VSL by a federal agency, the pressure to standardize VSLs among agencies (e.g., HM Treasury 
2011) or among countries (see, e.g., Fankhauser et al. 1997, in the context of climate change), 
and the adverse reaction to using a different (smaller) VSL for older people in EPA air 
regulations (Viscusi 2009) are consistent with widespread interest in equal value of risk 
reduction. Equal value of risk reduction is obviously not satisfied by CBA, nor is it satisfied by 
any of the benchmark SWFs (except by the ex post prioritarian SWF under restrictive parameter 
assumptions).  
(4) Risk equity preference. If a policy equalizes individuals’ risks of dying, does that count as a 
social improvement? A preference for risk equity was discussed by Keeney (1980) and is 
reflected in concerns for environmental justice (Lazarus 1993). Risk equity is closely related to 
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sensitivity to baseline risk. Equalizing risk improves social welfare under the ex ante prioritarian 
SWF and under CBA using equivalent variations (though not necessarily when using 
compensating variations), but not under the utilitarian and ex post prioritarian SWFs,  
(5) Catastrophe aversion. If a policy does not change the expected number of deaths, but reduces 
the chance of multiple individuals dying, does that count as a social improvement? It is widely 
noted that incidents in which many people die (e.g., an airliner crash or a nuclear disaster) are 
regarded as worse than an equal number of fatalities in unrelated events (e.g., traffic crashes or 
heart attacks). Keeney (1980) identifies catastrophe aversion as an attractive property, and 
catastrophic potential appears to be a major determinant of risk perceptions (Slovic 2000). 
However, neither CBA nor any of the benchmark SWFs are consistent with catastrophe aversion.  
In order to make the analysis tractable, we use the standard, one-period model that is 
familiar from the VSL literature. Results are derived for the five properties and summarized in 
Table 1 (at the end of Part II). 
 We examine the properties of equal value of risk reduction and catastrophe aversion in 
more detail in Parts III and IV, respectively. Many commentators seem to find one or both of 
these properties desirable in a risk-evaluation tool; and yet the latter property is not satisfied by 
either VSL or any of the benchmarks; the former, only by one of the benchmarks under 
restrictive assumptions. We therefore ask: if we introduce a different kind of SWF, or relax 
standard assumptions regarding the form of individual utility, are these properties satisfied? In 
Part III, we criticize the weighted utilitarian SWF suggested by Baker et al. (2008); but we 
concur in their suggestion that equal value of risk reduction might plausibly be achieved by 
combining the utilitarian SWF with a utility function that equalizes marginal utility of individual 
wealth when an individual is dead to its marginal utility when he is alive. In Part IV, we find that 
ex post “transformed” utilitarian and prioritarian SWFs—unlike CBA or any of the benchmark 
SWFs—satisfy catastrophe aversion with a concave “transformation” function.  
 Our analysis puts CBA using VSL in a new light. The particular manner in which VSL 
ranks risk-reduction measures is not the inevitable result of a welfarist approach to 
policymaking. VSL’s salient features can, if seen as undesirable, be mitigated by shifting to 
some social welfare function. However, we have not identified an SWF satisfying all of the 
properties that might plausibly be viewed as desirable. 
Short proofs are provided in the text or footnotes, with longer proofs relegated to an 
Appendix. 
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I. SWFs Under Uncertainty 
 The SWF approach assumes some interpersonally comparable utility function u(.). If x is 
an outcome, then u(x) = (u1(x), …., uN(x)), with N individuals in the population.2 (Throughout 
this article, we assume that N is the same in all outcomes.) An SWF is a rule R for ranking 
outcomes as a function of their associated utility vectors. It says: x ≽	y iff u(x) R u(y) (where 
“iff” means “if and only if”). The literature discusses standard forms for R. One is a utilitarian 
SWF: x ≽	y iff 
1 1
( ) ( ).
N N
i i
i i
u x u y
 
   Another is a “prioritarian” (additively separable, concave 
SWF): x ≽	y iff 
1 1
( ( )) ( ( ))
N N
i i
i i
g u x g u y
 
  , with g(.) a strictly increasing and concave real-valued 
function. A third is the “leximin” SWF, which ranks utility vectors according to their smallest 
entries, if these are equal their second- smallest, etc. Finally, the “rank-weighted” SWF uses 
fixed weights α1 > α2 … > αN, with α1 the weight for the smallest utility in a vector, α2 the second 
smallest, etc., and ranks vectors by summing weighted utilities.3 (On the different functional 
forms of an SWF, see generally Adler (2012); Bossert and Weymark (2004); Blackorby, Bossert 
and Donaldson (2005).) 
 As recent scholarship has shown, a wide range of possibilities exist for applying an SWF 
under uncertainty, with different axiomatic characteristics. (See generally Fleurbaey (2010); see 
also Adler (2012, Chapter 7)). In representing policy choice under uncertainty, we will use a 
standard Savage-style model where there is a set of states and a fixed probability assigned to 
each state s, πs. An action (e.g., governmental policy) maps each state onto an outcome. Let xa,s 
be the outcome of action a in state s.  
 Consider, first, the possibilities for a utilitarian SWF. “Ex post” untransformed 
utilitarianism assigns each action a number equaling the expected value of the sum of individual 
utilities. In other words, a ≽ b iff W(a) ≥ W(b), with W(a) = ,( )a ss i
s i
u x  . “Ex post” 
untransformed utilitarianism yields the same ranking of actions as “ex ante” utilitarianism, 
ranking actions according to the sum of individual expected utilities. Let Ui(a) = ,( )a ss i
s
u x  . 
Then “ex ante” utilitarianism says: a ≽ b iff W(a) ≥ W(b), with W(a) = ( )i
i
U a .  
                                                 
2 The ith argument of u(x), denoted ui(x), represents the well-being level of individual i in outcome x. Function u(.) 
is “interpersonally comparable” in the sense that these numbers represent well-being levels and differences are 
compared between persons. For example, ui(x) > uj(y) iff individual i in outcome x is better off than individual j in 
outcome y. On interpersonal comparability, see generally Adler (2012, Chapters 2 and 3). 
3 Let 1 2( ) ( ) ... ( )Nu x u x u x      denote a rank-ordered permutation of the vector u(x). Then the rank-ordered SWF 
ranks outcomes as follows, using some fixed set of strictly decreasing weights α1, …, αN: x ≽ y iff 
( ) ( )i i i i
i i
u x u y    , with x and y two outcomes.  
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 Ex post utilitarianism can also take a “transformed” form. Let h(.) be a strictly increasing 
(but not necessarily linear) function. Then ex post transformed utilitarianism sets W(a) = 
,( ( ))a ss i
s i
h u x  . Note that, if h(.) is non-linear, ex post transformed utilitarianism need not 
rank actions the same way as ex ante utilitarianism.  
 Consider, next, the possibilities for a prioritarian SWF. “Ex post” untransformed 
prioritarianism assigns each action a number equaling the expected value of the sum of a strictly 
increasing and concave function of individual utility. In other words, a ≽ b iff W(a) ≥ W(b), with 
W(a) = ,( ( ))a ss i
s i
g u x  . While ex post untransformed utilitarianism is mathematically 
equivalent to ex ante utilitarianism, ex post untransformed prioritarianism is not equivalent to 
“ex ante” prioritarianism, where W(a) = ( ( ))i
i
g U a . Finally, ex post transformed 
prioritarianism should be mentioned: W(a) = ,( ( ( ))a ss i
s i
h g u x  , with h(.) strictly increasing. 
 Fleurbaey (2010) focuses on the properties of a particular kind of ex post transformation: 
the “equally distributed equivalent” (EDE). Let w(.) be a function from utility vectors to real 
numbers corresponding to the utilitarian, prioritarian, or rank-weighted SWF, as the case may 
be.4 Let u* be such that w(u*, u*, …. , u*) = w(u(x)) for a given outcome x. Define the real-
valued function hEDE(.) as follows: hEDE(w(u(x)) = u*. In the case of the utilitarian SWF, hEDE(.) 
is just average utility: ( ( )) (1/ ) ( )EDE i i
i i
h u x N u x  , i.e., hEDE(w) = w/N. In this case, hEDE(.) is 
a linear function. By contrast, in the case of the prioritarian SWF, hEDE(.) is strictly convex. Note 
that 1( ( )) (1/ ) ( ( ))EDE i i
i i
h g u x g N g u x           , i.e., hEDE(w) = g-1(w/N), leading to W(a) = 
1 ,( ( ( ))a ss i
s i
g g u x    
 For simplicity, we will not consider the rank-weighted SWF or the leximin SWF. Instead, 
our focus will be on different possible methodologies for applying a utilitarian or prioritarian 
SWF to value risk-reduction measures.5 
                                                 
4 In the case of the utilitarian SWF, w(u(x)) = ( )i
i
u x ; in the case of the prioritarian SWF, w(u(x)) = ( ( ))i
i
g u x ; 
and the rank-weighted SWF, w(u(x)) = ( )i i
i
u x  . 
5 Some authors, e.g., Ben Porath, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1997), Ulph (1982), have characterized a “hybrid” 
approach. Let W(a) be the value assigned to an action by ex post (transformed or untransformed) utilitarianism, 
prioritarianism, or the rank-weighted approach, and W*(a) the value assigned by, respectively, ex ante utilitarianism, 
prioritarianism, or the rank weighted approach. Then if λ is between 0 and 1, the hybrid approach assigns each 
action a value equaling λW(a) + (1 − λ) W*(a). This approach, too, is beyond the scope of the current article.  
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II. VSL versus SWF: A Simple Model 
 For the remainder of the paper, unless otherwise noted, we use “CBA” to mean cost-
benefit analysis without distributive weights.6 CBA ranks policies by summing equivalent or 
compensating variations. As is well known, CBA does not provide a social ranking—it can 
violate completeness and transitivity (Blackorby and Donaldson, 1986). However, we can use 
CBA to define a social ranking of alternatives using equivalent or compensating variation from a 
fixed baseline. Consider some baseline action O, the “status quo” action. Let a, b, … be other 
possible actions (governmental policies). For a given such action a, let individual i’s equivalent 
variation EVia be the change to individual i’s wealth in every state of the world, in O, sufficient 
to make i ex ante indifferent as between O and a.7 Then we will say that CBA ranks actions by 
saying: a ≽ b iff WCBA(a) ≥ WCBA(b), where WCBA(a) = ai
i
EV . 
 In order to compare CBA to various SWFs, we adopt the following simple, one-period 
model—one that is frequently used in the discussion of VSL. Each policy (a, b, …) is such that 
each individual has the same wealth (cia, cib, etc.) in all states as a result of that policy (although 
not necessarily the same across policies or individuals.) For a given policy, the state determines 
which individuals will be alive or dead. We introduce lia,s, which has the value 1 if individual i is 
alive and 0 if dead. Utility functions u(.) and v(.) are the (common and interpersonally 
comparable) utility functions of wealth if individuals are alive and dead, respectively (i.e., v(.) is 
the bequest function).  
We assume, as is standard in the VSL literature, that u(c) > v(c), u′(c) > v′(c) ≥ 0 and 
u′′(c) ≤ 0, v′′(c) ≤ 0. We refer to this package of assumptions as the “standard” utility model 
(although it should be recognized that the assumptions are not entailed by expected utility 
theory; we relax some of them in Part III.B). 
Let pia be individual i’s probability of being alive with policy a, that is, pia = ,a ss i
s
l . 
Then Ui(a), individual i’s expected utility with action a, is simply pia u(cia) + (1 − pia) v(cia). 
                                                 
6 Most SWFs can be mimicked by CBA with appropriate distributive weights (Adler 2012, pp. 109-10; Drèze and 
Stern, 1987). Since the theme of this article is the divergence between SWFs and traditional, unweighted, CBA, we 
do not address the specification of weights here.  
7 Alternatively, one can construct a ranking using the sum of compensating variations from a fixed baseline where 
individual i’s compensating variation CVia is the change to individual i’s wealth in every state of the world, in a, 
sufficient to make i ex ante indifferent as between O and a, CVib is the analogous change to individual i’s wealth in 
every state of the world, in b, and so forth. The social ranking based on compensating variation can violate the 
Pareto principle, while the social ranking based on equivalent variation cannot. The reason is that the individual's 
marginal utility of wealth can depend on the state of the world (e.g., if he lives or dies). An individual may prefer a 
to b, but if his marginal utility of wealth in a exceeds his marginal utility of wealth in b, CVia can be smaller than 
CVib. If no one else in the population is affected by shifting from the status quo to a or to b, then a is Pareto superior 
to b yet CBA using compensating variation will rank b superior to a. This situation cannot arise using the social 
ranking based on equivalent variation from a fixed baseline, which always adds wealth to the states associated with 
the same action (the status quo action 0). 
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 Some of our results in this section depend upon a zero bequest function, i.e., v(c) = 0 for 
all c. Note that this is consistent with the standard utility model.8 
 We focus in this Part on three benchmark SWFs: ex post untransformed utilitarianism 
(which is equivalent, recall, to ex ante utilitarianism); ex post untransformed prioritarianism, and 
ex ante prioritarianism. Because ex post transformed utilitarianism and prioritarianism are not 
considered until Part III, we can without confusion omit the adjective “untransformed” and refer 
to ex post untransformed utilitarianism as, simply, “utilitarianism”; and to ex post untransformed 
prioritarianism as, simply, “ex post prioritarianism.”  
 Utilitarianism, ex post prioritarianism, and ex ante prioritarianism are widely used. 
Moreover, in the case of the simple one-period model under discussion, they can be expressed in 
a simple way. As already discussed, each of these approaches (like CBA) ranks policies via a 
rule of the form: a ≽ b iff W(a) ≥ W(b). Let WU, WEPP, and WEAP denote the W-functions 
associated, respectively, with these three approaches. Then the following can be 
straightforwardly established: 
 WU(a) = ( )i
i
U a  
  WEPP(a) = ( ( )) (1 ) ( ( ))a a a ai i i i
i
p g u c p g v c     
  WEAP(a) = ( ( ))i
i
g U a  
Note that, in each case—as with WCBA—the ranking of policies is just a function of each 
individual’s wealth and the probability of her death.  
 In the case where policies represent a small variation in individual risk and/or wealth 
around the status quo policy O, we can use the total differential to approximate a change in WCBA, 
WU, WEPP, and WEAP. As a shorthand, and without risk of confusion, we will use the term pi to 
mean individual i’s survival probability in the status quo (strictly, piO); ci to mean individual i’s 
wealth in the status quo (strictly, ciO); Ui her expected utility in the status quo (strictly, UiO); and 
a function incorporating these terms (such as /i iU p  ) to mean the function evaluated at the 
status quo values (here, /i iU p  evaluated at the values UiO and piO). 
                                                 
8 In distinguishing between the case where v(c) = 0 and v(c) ≠ 0, we are assuming that the common, interpersonally 
comparable utility function u*(c, l) that gives rise to u(.) and v(.)—l an indicator variable indicating whether the 
individual is alive or dead— is unique up to a positive ratio transformation, not merely a positive affine 
transformation. Prioritarian SWFs, indeed, make stronger assumptions on the measurability of utility than 
utilitarianism.  
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 Consider, now, some policy a that changes each individual i’s survival probability by 
∆pia and her wealth by ∆cia. Then it can be seen that:9  
 ∆WCBA(a) ≈ [ ]a ai i i
i
c VSL p   , 
 where VSLi is individual i’s marginal rate of substitution between survival probability and wealth 
in O, i.e., /
/
i i
i i
U p
U c
 
  , which equals
( ) ( )
( ) (1 ) ( )
i i
i i i i
u c v c
p u c p v c

    . Similarly, 
 ∆WU(a) ≈ [ [ ( ) (1 ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]]a ai i i i i i i i
i
c p u c p v c p u c v c         
 ∆WEPP(a) ≈ [ [ ( ( )) ( ) (1 ) ( ( )) ( )] [ ( ( )) ( ( ))]]a ai i i i i i i i i i
i
c p g u c u c p g v c v c p g u c g v c           
  ∆WEAP(a) ≈ [ [ ( )( ( ) (1 ) ( )] [ ( )( ( ) ( ))]]a ai i i i i i i i i i
i
c g U p u c p v c p g U u c v c           
 It is useful to think of WCBA, WU, WEPP, and WEAP as different methodologies for assigning 
a “social value” to policies. Note that, in each case, the total-differential approximation allows us 
to distinguish (1) the change in “social value” associated with the change in individual i’s wealth 
(∆cia) from (2) the change in “social value” associated with the change in her survival probability 
(∆pia). The latter change is just ( / ) ai iW p p   . For short, let us say that the social value of risk 
reduction, for a given individual i, according to a given W, is just / iW p  . (To be clear, this 
social value may well depend upon i’s wealth in the status quo ci, her survival probability pi, or 
both.) Note that, in the case of CBA, the social value of risk reduction is simply VSLi. 
 We now turn to the central question of this Part. How do these different approaches 
compare in assigning social value to risk reduction? In particular, in the status quo, individual i 
has wealth ci and survival probability pi, while individual j has a different amount of wealth cj 
and/or a different survival probability pj. How does the social value of risk reduction for the first 
individual, / iW p  , compare with the social value of risk reduction for the second, / jW p  — 
with “social value” calculated using WCBA or, alternatively, WU, WEPP, and WEAP?  
 Note that the social value of risk reduction is positive for all of the W functions 
considered here, regardless of individual wealth and baseline risk. Thus 
i j
W W
p p
   iff /
i
j
W p
W p
 
 
> 1. In what follows, we often focus on the ratio 
/
i
j
W p
W p
 
  .
10 
                                                 
9 Let ∆WCBA(a) = WCBA(a) – WCBA(O), and similarly for the other approaches. 
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A. Wealth Sensitivity 
 Consider the case where individual i has more status quo wealth than individual j (ci > cj) 
and both have the same survival probability pi = pj. This set-up allows us to isolate the effect of 
individual wealth on the social value of individual risk reduction. We define a social ranking as 
(positively) wealth sensitive if it always assigns higher value to reducing risk to the wealthier of 
two individuals having the same mortality risk.  
Definition 1: Let ci > cj and pi = pj. A social ranking is (positively) wealth sensitive iff 
i j
W W
p p
   .
 
The following equations summarize the social value of risk reduction for CBA as compared with 
utilitarianism, ex post prioritarianism, and ex ante prioritarianism. 
 ( ) ( )
( ) (1 ) ( )
CBA
i i
i
i i i i i
u c v cW VSL
p p u c p v c
        
 ( ) ( )
U
i i
i
W u c v c
p
    
 ( ( )) ( ( ))
EPP
i i
i
W g u c g v c
p
    
 ( )( ( ) ( ))
EAP
i i i
i
W g U u c v c
p
     
  CBA is (positively) sensitive to individual wealth. As is well known, CBA assigns the 
wealthier individual a greater social value of individual risk reduction: VSLi/VSLj > 1. The same 
is true of utilitarianism: ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
i i
j j
u c v c
u c v c

  > 1, on the assumption that u′(.) > v′(.). 
 However, ex post and ex ante prioritarianism do not necessarily assign the wealthier 
individual a greater social value of risk reduction. In the case of ex post prioritarianism, the 
relevant ratio is ( ( )) ( ( ))
( ( )) ( ( ))
i i
j j
g u c g v c
g u c g v c

 . In the case of ex ante prioritarianism, it is 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 In this article, we are interested in the ordinal properties of the different W functions (WCBA, WU, WEPP, and WEAP), 
i.e., the ordinal ranking of policies that they generate. Our interest in the ratio just described is consistent with the 
fact that W merely has ordinal significance. Let f(.) be any differentiable, strictly increasing function. Then 
( ) ( )
i j
f W f W
p p
   iff ( ) ( )i j
W W
f W f W
p p
     iff 
/
/
1i
j
W p
W p
 
   , since f '(.) > 0 as are / iW p  and / jW p  . 
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( )( ( ) ( ))
( )( ( ) ( ))
i i i
j j j
g U u c v c
g U u c v c
 
  . With ci > cj, these ratios can be greater than, less than, or equal to one, 
depending on the functional forms of g(.), u(.), and v(.).11 We therefore arrive at our first result.  
PROPOSITION I: CBA and utilitarianism are (positively) wealth sensitive: the social value 
of individual risk reduction increases with individual wealth. In the case of ex post 
prioritarianism and ex ante prioritarianism, the social value of individual risk reduction 
can increase with individual wealth, decrease with individual wealth, or remain neutral—
depending on the functional forms of g(.), u(.), and v(.).  
 This is an important result. CBA’s positive wealth sensitivity in valuing risk reduction 
does not emerge as a general feature of welfarism (even if we confine our attention to the three 
benchmark SWFs, let alone other SWFs). Although VSLi increases with individual wealth, that is 
not necessarily true of 
EPP
i
W
p

 or 
EAP
i
W
p

 . 
 Can we achieve clearer results regarding the wealth sensitivity of ex post and ex ante 
prioritarianism by restricting the bequest function to be zero (v(.) = 0)? With a zero bequest 
function, ex post prioritarianism is only well-defined if g(0) is well-defined.12 Continuing to 
focus on the case where ci > cj and pi = pj, the ratio 
/
/
EPP
i
EPP
j
W p
W p
 
  becomes 
( ( )) (0)
( ( )) (0)
i
j
g u c g
g u c g

 , which 
is greater than unity, since g(.) and u(.) are strictly increasing.  
 However, even with a zero bequest function, ex ante prioritarianism may be insensitive to 
wealth in valuing risk reduction, or may give less weight to risk reduction as individuals become 
wealthier. Note that the ratio 
/
/
EAP
i
EAP
j
W p
W p
 
  becomes 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
i i
j j
g U u c
g U u c

 . Setting g(.) = log makes this 
ratio unity. Moreover, if the g(.) function is more concave than the logarithm, ex ante 
prioritarianism is negatively wealth-sensitive—assigning a lower social value to risk reduction 
for wealthier individuals.13 
                                                 
11 Consider, first, ex post prioritarianism. The ratio is greater than one in the case of a zero bequest function, the case 
considered immediately below. Alternatively, let v(.) = ku(.) with 0< k< 1. With g(x) = log x, the ratio is unity while 
with g(x) = −1/x for instance, the ratio is less than one. Next consider ex ante prioritarianism. As discussed 
immediately below, the ratio can be greater than, less than, or equal to zero even if the bequest function is 
constrained to be zero, and a fortiori without such constraint. 
12 This rules out strictly increasing, strictly concave g(.) functions with g(0) = −∞, such as the log function, or – 
(1/x)γ with γ > 0. 
13 Let F(c) = g′(pu(c))u(c). Then ( ) ( ) 1
( ) ( )
i i
j j
g U u c
g U u c
  (resp. < 1) for any ci > cj with a zero bequest function reduces to 
F′(.) > 0 (resp. < 0) for all c. But note that F′(c) > 0 for all c just in case −xg′′(x)/g′(x) > 1 for all x, i.e., g(.) has a 
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 A different aspect of the problem of wealth sensitivity concerns whether CBA has a 
greater degree of wealth sensitivity, in valuing risk reduction, than competing approaches. We 
show (in the Appendix) that CBA has a greater degree of wealth sensitivity than both 
utilitarianism and ex ante prioritarianism. In addition, it has a higher degree of wealth sensitivity 
than ex post prioritarianism with a zero bequest function. 
B. Sensitivity to Baseline Risk 
 Next, we isolate the effect of individual survival probability on the social value of risk 
reduction—by considering a case where individual i has survival probability pi in the status quo, 
individual j has survival probability pj, with pi > pj, and the two individuals have the same 
wealth. We define (positive) sensitivity to baseline risk as follows: 
Definition 2: Let pi > pj and ci = cj. A social ranking is (positively) sensitive to baseline risk iff 
డௐ
డ௣೔ ൏
డௐ
డ௣ೕ.  
 As is well-known, VSLi/VSLj < 1; hence CBA accords a higher social value to individual 
risk reduction for individuals at lower survival probability . This is the so-called “dead anyway” 
effect (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1996). Ex ante prioritarianism also displays the dead-anyway effect: 
/
/
EAP
i
EAP
j
W p
W p
 
  simplifies to g′(Ui)/g′(Uj) in the case at hand, which is less than unity because Ui > 
Uj and g(.) is strictly concave, i.e., gʹ strictly decreasing. By contrast, for ex post prioritarianism 
and utilitarianism, the social value of risk reduction is insensitive to baseline risk. Note that 
/U iW p  and /EPP iW p  are, each, solely a function of i’s wealth; and thus //
i
j
W p
W p
 
   is, in each 
case, unity where i and j have the same wealth, regardless of their survival probabilities. 
PROPOSITION II: CBA and ex ante prioritarianism are (positively) sensitive to baseline 
risk. By contrast, utilitarianism and ex post prioritarianism are insensitive to baseline risk. 
 Scholarship on risk reduction often discusses whether a preference for aiding “identified” 
rather than “statistical” victims is justified. We might say that an individual is an “identified” 
victim if her probability of surviving the current period, absent governmental intervention, is 
zero or (more generally) sufficiently low. An immediate implication of the last paragraph is that 
CBA and ex ante prioritarianism, but not utilitarianism or ex post prioritarianism, display a 
preference for aiding identified victims. Concerns about environmental justice and cumulative 
risk are also consistent with a social value of risk reduction that is increasing with the 
individual’s baseline risk, at least to the extent that the baseline risk is determined by 
environmental exposures. 
                                                                                                                                                             
degree of concavity globally less than unity; that F′(c) < 0 for all c just in case −xg′′(x)/g′(x) < 1 for all x; and that 
−xg′′(x)/g′(x) = 1 if g(x) = log x. 
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C. Equal Value of Risk Reduction 
 As discussed above, there is often reluctance to assign different social values to reducing 
risk to people with different characteristics. In the simple model we consider, individuals are 
identical except for any differences in their wealth c or survival probability p. Hence equal value 
of risk reduction requires insensitivity to both wealth and baseline risk. 
Definition 3: A social ranking satisfies equal value of risk reduction iff ࣔࢃࣔ࢖࢏ ൌ
ࣔࢃ
ࣔ࢖࢐ ∀ pi, pj, ci, cj. 
W(.) displays equal value of risk reduction if /
/
i
j
W p
W p
 
  is unity regardless of the survival 
probabilities or wealth of i and j. As we have seen, CBA and the utilitarian SWF are wealth 
sensitive, while CBA and the ex ante prioritarian SWF are sensitive to baseline risk. It thus 
follows immediately that CBA, the utilitarian SWF, and the ex ante prioritarian SWF do not 
exhibit equal value of risk reduction. By contrast, ex post prioritarianism can satisfy equal value 
of risk reduction—but only under restrictive assumptions regarding g(.) and individual utility.14  
PROPOSITION III: Neither CBA, nor utilitarianism, nor ex ante prioritarianism satisfy 
equal value of risk reduction. Under all these approaches, the social value of individual risk 
reduction depends upon the individual’s wealth, survival probability, or both. Ex post 
prioritarianism satisfies equal value of risk reduction only under restrictive assumptions 
regarding g(.) and individual utility. 
D. Risk Equity Preference 
  A policymaking methodology has a preference for risk equity if it prefers to equalize 
survival probabilities. Imagine that, in the baseline, individual j has a lower survival probability 
than individual i: pj < pi. A policy increases individual j’s survival probability to pj + ∆p, and 
decreases individual i’s survival probability to pi − ∆p, leaving j still at a survival probability no 
higher than i. (In other words, the policy secures a Pigou-Dalton transfer in survival probability.) 
The policy does not change other individuals’ survival probabilities, or anyone’s wealth. Then 
we say: (1) a policymaking methodology has a weak preference for risk equity if it prefers the 
policy to baseline as long as i and j have the same wealth; and (2) a policymaking methodology 
has a strong preference for risk equity if it prefers the policy to baseline regardless of the wealth 
of the two individuals.  
Definition 4: Let pi' = pi – p > pj' = pj + p, with p > 0. Consider a policy a leading to (pi', 
pj') and a policy b leading to (pi, pj) while leaving unaffected the survival probabilities and 
wealth levels of all individuals in society excluding i and j. A social ranking satisfies a weak 
                                                 
14 Let F(c) = g(u(c)) –g(v(c)). Then it is easy to see that ex post prioritarianism satisfies equal value of risk reduction 
iff F'(c) = 0. A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for this to be true is v(.) = ku(.), with 0<k<1 and g(x) = log x. 
Note that ex post prioritarianism with a zero bequest function exhibits wealth sensitivity (as discussed earlier) and 
therefore fails to satisfy equal value of risk reduction. 
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preference for risk equity iff a ≽ b for ci = cj and a strong preference for risk equity iff a ≽ b 
holds ∀ ci, cj.  
It is immediate from the definitions that weak preference for risk equity is closely related 
to (positive) sensitivity to baseline risk. Indeed, the preference relationship in the definition of 
weak risk equity preference is satisfied for infinitesimal p if and only if the social ranking is 
positively sensitive to baseline risk. Hence sensitivity to baseline risk is a necessary condition for 
risk equity. As we have seen, utilitarianism and ex post prioritarianism are insensitive to baseline 
risk and hence they do not exhibit a preference for risk equity. 
Interestingly, CBA exhibits risk equity preference in the weak sense when the social 
ranking is defined using equivalent variation, but may not satisfy it using compensating 
variation. A proof is provided in the Appendix. The difference arises because the effect of wealth 
on VSL augments the difference between individuals in the case of equivalent variation, but 
offsets and can reverse the difference in the case of compensating variation.  
 Ex ante prioritarianism satisfies risk equity preference in the weak sense. This is 
generally true, with either a zero or non-zero bequest function, as long as u(.) and v(.) satisfy the 
standard conditions. Note also that, with a logarithmic g(.) function and a zero bequest function, 
ex ante prioritarianism satisfies risk equity in the strong sense. However, this latter result does 
not extend beyond this special case. See Appendix.  
PROPOSITION IV: CBA (using equivalent variations) and ex ante prioritarianism satisfy 
risk equity preference in the weak sense. CBA (using compensating variations), 
utilitarianism and ex post prioritarianism do not. Ex ante prioritarianism satisfies risk 
equity preference in the strong sense under restrictive assumptions regarding g(.) and 
individual utility.   
E. Catastrophe Aversion 
 Keeney (1980) offers a definition of catastrophe aversion that is cited with some 
frequency in the literature. Assume that policy a has a probability πd of d premature deaths and a 
probability (1- πd) of no deaths, while policy b has a probability πdʹ of dʹ premature deaths and a 
probability (1- πdʹ) of no deaths. Assume, further, that the two policies have the same number of 
expected deaths (dπd = dʹπdʹ), but d is less than dʹ. Then a policymaking tool is catastrophe-averse 
in Keeney’s sense (for short, “Keeney catastrophe averse”) if it prefers policy a to b.  
 The concept of a mean-preserving spread (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970) suggests a 
natural generalization of Keeney catastrophe aversion. Let D be a random variable representing 
the number of fatalities. Let us say that a policymaking tool is “globally catastrophe averse” if it 
dislikes a mean-preserving spread of D. Note that Keeney catastrophe aversion is a particular 
case of global catastrophe aversion in which D is binary with one outcome having zero fatalities. 
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Definition 5: Let Dʹ be a mean-preserving spread of D, both random variables. Consider a 
policy a leading to D fatalities and a policy b leading to Dʹ fatalities. A social ranking 
exhibits strong global catastrophe aversion iff a ≽ b and weak global catastrophe aversion iff 
a ≽ b holds whenever all individuals have equal wealth.  
Strikingly, not only CBA, but all three of the benchmark SWFs discussed in this Part fail 
catastrophe aversion in both the global sense and the Keeney sense. Indeed, these tools are not 
catastrophe averse in these senses even if all individuals have the same wealth. 
 The reason that CBA and the three benchmarks fail these catastrophe-aversion conditions 
is straightforward. Both CBA and the three benchmark SWFs under consideration assign social 
value to policies in a manner that is additively separable across individuals. In other words, they 
all take the form W(a) = ( , , , )O O a ai i i i
i
f p c p c .15 Whether a given individual happens to die in a 
state where many other individuals do, or in a state where few others do, has no influence on 
social value. 
PROPOSITION V: CBA and the three benchmarks lack the properties of Keeney and of 
weak global catastrophe aversion. 
F.  A Summary 
 Table 1 summarizes the results of this Part, regarding the five properties of interest and 
whether they are satisfied by VSL and by the three benchmark SWFs. 
  
                                                 
15 In the case of CBA, the calculation of individual i’s EV for some policy a depends both on his risk and wealth 
characteristics in the baseline outcome O, and on his risk and wealth characteristics with the policy. Thus f(.) is a 
function of piO and ciO as well as pia and cia. In the case of the three benchmark SWFs, the arguments for the f(.) 
function are just pia and cia. In either event, these policy-evaluation methodologies are separable across individuals. 
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Table 1 
 Positive 
Wealth 
Sensitivity 
Positive 
Sensitivity to 
Baseline Risk 
Equal Value 
of Risk 
Reduction 
Risk Equity 
Preference 
Catastrophe 
Aversion 
CBA Yes Yes No Yes for 
equivalent 
variations 
(weak risk 
equity) 
No  
Utilitarian 
SWF 
Yes No  No No No  
Ex Post 
Prioritarian 
SWF 
Depends on 
g(.), u(.) and 
v(.). Yes 
under a zero 
bequest 
function. 
No  Yes, with 
appropriate 
restrictions on 
g(.), u(.) and 
v(.) 
No No 
Ex Ante 
Prioritarian 
SWF 
Depends on 
g(.), u(.) and 
v(.). 
Yes No Yes (to weak 
form; satisfies 
strong risk 
equity with 
zero bequest 
function and 
g(.) = log) 
No 
 
III. Equal Value of Risk Reduction: A Further Inquiry 
 Our analysis in Part II showed that CBA, utilitarianism, and ex ante prioritarianism do 
not satisfy equal value of risk reduction, and that ex post prioritarianism does not do so except 
under restrictive parameter assumptions. In undertaking this analysis, as throughout Part II, we 
assumed that individual utility satisfied the standard constraints in the one-period model: u(c) > 
v(c), u′(c) > v′(c), and u′′(c) ≤ 0, v′′(c) ≤ 0. 
 Many seem to find equal value of risk reduction—the equal valuation of lives, 
independent of individual characteristics—to be a desirable feature of a policy-evaluation 
methodology (see Baker et al. (2008) and Somanathan (2006)). Indeed, this view is reflected in 
governmental use of population-average rather than differentiated VSL figures. Moreover, 
Fankhauser et al. (1997) and Johansson-Stenman (2000) report that one of the most debated 
issues of the socio-economic chapter of the IPCC report was the use of a smaller value of life in 
poor countries than in rich countries (they compute implicit numerical values of individual utility 
and ex ante prioritarian SWF (assuming power forms) that would lead to equal value of risk 
reduction for specific income differences between rich and poor countries). 
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In this Part, we consider two different theoretical avenues for securing equal value of risk 
reduction: introducing some SWF other than the three benchmarks, or relaxing the standard 
constraints on the utility function. Our results are negative in the first case, affirmative in the 
second. We also address what our analysis means for the use of population average VSL. 
A. Is there a Plausible SWF that Satisfies Equal Value of Risk Reduction with the Standard 
Utility Model? 
 Let us consider, first, how variations in the functional form of the SWF might implicate 
the “equal value of risk reduction” property—holding fixed, for now, the assumptions that u(c) > 
v(c), u′(c) > v′(c) ≥ 0, and u′′(c) ≤ 0, v′′(c) ≤ 0. We do not consider the rank-weighted or leximin 
SWFs, which lie beyond the scope of this article, but instead discuss the ex post transformed 
utilitarian SWF; the ex post transformed prioritarian SWF; and an SWF suggested by Baker et al. 
(2008). 
 It is straightforward to see that ex post transformed utilitarianism does not satisfy equal 
value of risk reduction with a zero bequest function. Assume that, in the status quo, individual i 
has wealth ci and individual j has wealth cj, with ci > cj. State s is such that all individuals are 
dead; it has probability πs. One policy saves individual i in state s (thus increasing his probability 
of survival by ∆p = πs); a second policy saves individual j in state s (thus increasing his survival 
probability by the same amount). With h(.) the transformation function, the increase in social 
value from the first policy is πsh(u(ci)) − πsh(0) ; the increase in social value from the second 
policy is πsh(u(cj)) − πsh(0). For these to be the same amount, it must be the case that h(u(ci)) = 
h(u(cj)) even though ci > cj. But u(ci) > u(cj), since u'(.) > 0, and thus h(u(ci)) > h(u(cj)) since h(.) 
is strictly increasing.  
In the Appendix, we generalize the proof, showing that ex post transformed utilitarianism 
does not satisfy equal value of risk reduction with a nonzero bequest function. We also show that 
ex post transformed prioritarianism does not satisfy this condition.  
Baker et al. (2008) suggest one may achieve equal value of risk reduction via weighted 
utilitarianism. (In discussing this proposal, for the sake of clarity, we use superscripts to denote 
the status quo or alternative policies, so that piO means i’s survival probability in the status quo, 
O, cja j’s wealth with policy a, and so forth.) 
  Let βi be a weighting factor for individual i equaling ,1 / ( ) 1/ ( ( ) ( ))O Oi i O Oi i iU p
i
U u c v c
p
    . 
Consider a weighted utilitarian SWF for which W(a) = ai i
i
U . This SWF satisfies equal value 
of risk reduction. If i has baseline survival probability piO and baseline wealth ciO, while j has a 
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possibly different baseline survival probability pjO and possibly different wealth cjO, 
/
/
i
j
W p
W p
 
   in 
the baseline is just ( ( ) ( )) 1/ ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ))
( ( ) ( )) 1/ ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ))
O O O O O O
i i i i i i i
O O O O O O
j j j j j j j
u c v c u c v c u c v c
u c v c u c v c u c v c


     =1. 
 However, closer inspection suggests that this SWF is problematic. The most natural 
interpretation of the Baker et al. (2008) proposal is that the weights are assigned to each 
individual depending upon her baseline characteristics in O, but are then held “rigid”: in order to 
calculate the sum of weighted utilities for any policy a, the weighting factor for individual i is βi, 
regardless of i’s characteristics (wealth and survival probability) in a. This approach violates the 
“anonymity” or “impartiality” axiom – a basic principle that any minimally plausible SWF 
should satisfy. Assume that, in policy a, individuals have wealth and survival probabilities ((c1, 
p1), (c2, p2), … (cN, pN)), while in policy b these pairs are permuted. Then 
“anonymity”/”impartiality” requires that a SWF be indifferent between a and b; but the form of 
weighted utilitarianism now under discussion need not be.16 
 A different interpretation is the weights are not “rigid,” but instead assigned by a 
weighting function. In other words, W(a) = ( , )a a ai i i
i
p c U , where ( , ) 1/ [ ( ) ( )]a a a ai i i ip c u c v c   . 
This SWF can violate the Pareto principle (at least if the bequest function is zero). Consider a 
policy that departs from baseline by increasing some individuals’ wealth (by a small or large 
amount), without changing anyone’s survival probability. Then the Pareto principle obviously 
requires that the policy be preferred, but the SWF now being discussed will be indifferent 
between policy and baseline.17 
B. Relaxing Standard Assumptions Regarding the Utility Function 
 Although Baker et al. focus on the (implausible) weighted-utilitarian SWF, they suggest 
in a footnote that equal value of risk reduction might also be achieved in an alternative manner—
via a utility function such that individual expected utility is separable in wealth and survival 
probability and linear in the latter. Such an expected utility function violates the standard 
assumption u'(c) > v'(c). The Baker et al. suggestion invites a more general framing of the 
                                                 
16 It might be protested that failures of anonymity require “large” rather than small departures from the baseline—
and Baker et al. (2008) are only proposing their SWF for small changes—but this is not true. Imagine that, in the 
baseline, one individual has wealth c and another wealth c*, which is slightly larger, and that they have the same 
survival probability. Imagine that the policy increases the first individual’s wealth to c* and decreases the second’s 
to c. Then anonymity requires that this “small” departure from the baseline be ranked equally good as baseline; but 
the “rigid” form of weighted utilitarianism will not do that.  
17 Admittedly, the ex post prioritarian SWF can also violate the Pareto principle. However, such violation only 
occurs when the social planner is choosing under conditions of uncertainty. By contrast, the weighted-utilitarian 
SWF under discussion in this paragraph can violate the Pareto principle even if the planner knows, for certain, how 
individuals will be affected. (Even if pia is one or zero for all individuals and actions, a violation of the Pareto 
principle can occur.) Arguably, an SWF which conflicts with the Pareto principle under conditions of certainty is 
especially problematic. See generally Adler (2012), Chapter 7. 
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question: What are the possible relaxations of the standard utility model that will achieve equal 
value of risk reduction? 
 Consider first the possibility of setting u(c) = v(c) + k, k > 0, u'(c) = v'(c) > 0, u''(c) = 
v''(c) ≤ 0. It should be stressed that these assumptions are perfectly consistent with expected 
utility theory. Nor do they seem absurd. If c is defined as wealth after insurance premiums and 
payouts, u'(.) and v'(.) might plausibly be equal, since optimal insurance equalizes the marginal 
utility of money across states of the world. Inspection of the formulas earlier for 
i
W
p

 for W
CBA, 
WU, WEPP, and WEAP show that, in this case, WU (“utilitarianism” or, more precisely, ex post 
untransformed utilitarianism) will secure equal value of risk reduction: 
/
/
U
i
U
j
W p
W p
 
  will be unity 
regardless of the survival probability and wealth of i and j. This is not true of CBA or of the 
other two benchmark SWFs.18  
C. Population Average VSL figures and equal value of risk reduction 
 The analysis of equal value of risk reduction places in a new light the standard 
governmental practice of using population-average VSL values. Such a practice is problematic, 
from the perspective of CBA, because VSL is heterogeneous. However, the use of population-
average VSL values is also problematic from the perspective of any SWF that fails equal value 
of risk reduction. Recall that, with the standard utility model, the utilitarian SWF (even with a 
transformation function) and ex ante prioritarian SWF do not satisfy equal value of risk 
reduction, and that the ex post prioritarian SWF (even with a transformation function) does so 
only under restrictive parameter assumptions regarding g(.), u(.) and v(.).  
 For the sake of illustration, consider the utilitarian (ex post untransformed utilitarian) 
SWF.19 Imagine that, in the baseline policy, the average VSL value is K. Assume that we have a 
series of policies, a, b, …, each of which changes individual wealth and survival probabilities 
from the baseline by a small amount. Policy a corresponds to (∆c1a, …, ∆cNa, ∆p1a, …, ∆pNa), 
                                                 
18 Assume that for all c, u(c) – v(c) = k > 0, and thus u'(c) = v'(c). Consider two individuals with survival 
probabilities pi and pj and wealth ci and cj. Then 
( )
( )
ji
j i
u cVSL
VSL u c
  , which is not unity with ci ≠ cj if u(.) is strictly 
concave (rather than linear). 
/ ( ( )) ( ( ) )
/ ( ( )) ( ( ) )
EPP
i i i
EPP
j j j
W p g u c g u c k
W p g u c g u c k
        , which is not unity with ci ≠ cj, since g(.) is 
strictly concave. Finally, 
/ ( ( ) (1 ) )
/ ( ( ) (1 ) )
EAP
i i i
EAP
j j j
W p g u c p k
W p g u c p k
         , which is not unity with pi = pj and ci ≠ cj given the 
strict concavity of g(.). 
 
 
19 A similar analysis could be provided for any SWF that violates equal value of risk reduction.  
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and so on . For simplicity, assume that each individual’s wealth change is the same for all 
policies: ∆cia = ∆cib for all a, b. Then CBA using population-average VSL ranks the policies 
using the following simple rule: a better than b iff ( ) ( )a bi i
i i
K p K p    . For small wealth and 
probability changes, the utilitarian SWF ranks the policies using the rule: a better than b iff 
( )( ( ) ( )) ( )( ( ) ( ))a bi i i i i i
i i
p u c v c p u c v c      . Unless (1) all affected individuals have the same 
wealth in the baseline, or (2) we relax the standard utility model (so that u(c) – v(c) is a constant 
for all c), the ranking of the policies achieved by the ex post utilitarian rule will not generally be 
the same as the ranking achieved using population-average VSL values. 
IV. Catastrophe Aversion: A Further Inquiry 
 We earlier introduced Keeney catastrophe aversion and a more general concept—global 
catastrophe aversion—and observed that neither CBA, nor the three benchmark SWFs, are 
globally or Keeney catastrophe averse even if all individuals have the same wealth. 
 In this Part, we consider the catastrophe-aversion properties of the ex post transformed 
utilitarian SWF and ex post transformed prioritarian SWF. We continue to focus on catastrophe 
aversion in the weak sense: where all individuals have the same wealth. Henceforth “weak” will 
be implicit. 
 A striking fact is that ex post transformed utilitarianism and ex post transformed 
prioritarianism will satisfy Keeney catastrophe aversion if and only if the social transformation 
function h(.) is strictly concave. To see this, consider a population of N individuals out of which 
d individuals will die if a catastrophe occurs. All have the same wealth c; let “u” and “v” denote 
u(c) and v(c), respectively. Keep the expected number of deaths n constant, so that the 
probability of catastrophe is π = n/d.  
 Consider ex post transformed utilitarianism. If N-d individuals are alive, the social value 
of that state, according to ex post transformed utilitarianism, is h((N−d)u+dv). Accordingly, 
social welfare is equal to W(d) = (n/d)h(Nu+d(v−u)) + (1−(n/d))h(Nu). Keeney catastrophe 
aversion means that social welfare must be decreasing in the number of fatalities d. That is, there 
is Keeney catastrophe aversion if and only if W′(d) < 0. We easily obtain W′(d) = 
−(n/d2)(h(Nu+d(v−u))−h(Nu)) + (n/d)(v−u)h′(Nu+d(v−u)). It is straightforward then that W′(d) 
is negative for all parameters N,u,v and d if and only if (h(s)−h(r))/(s−r)<h′(r) for all s and r 
such that s>r, which indeed holds iff h(.) is strictly concave. 
 It is easy to generalize this result to global catastrophe aversion. If the random number of 
fatalities is D, social welfare under ex post transformed utilitarianism simply becomes 
Eh((N−D)u+Dv) in which E is the expectation operator over D. It is immediate then that there is 
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global catastrophe aversion if and only if h((N−d)u+dv) is strictly concave in d, that is, if and 
only if h is strictly concave.  
 A parallel analysis shows that ex post transformed prioritarianism satisfies Keeney and 
global catastrophe aversion iff the transformation function is concave. Continuing the discussion 
of the previous paragraph: social welfare under ex post transformed prioritarianism simply 
becomes Eh((N-d)g(u)+dg(v)). There is global catastrophe aversion if and only if h((N-
d)g(u)+dg(v)) is concave in d, that is, if and only if h is concave.20  
PROPOSITION VI: Ex post transformed utilitarianism and prioritarianism satisfy Keeney 
and weak global catastrophe aversion iff the transformation function h(.) is strictly 
concave. 
 One immediate implication of this result is that Fleurbaey (2010)’s EDE transformation 
function hEDE(.), combined with utilitarianism or prioritarianism, fails Keeney and global 
catastrophe aversion.21 As discussed in Part I, if the underlying SWF is utilitarian, hEDE(.) is 
linear; if the underlying SWF is prioritarian, hEDE(.) is strictly convex.22  
 We can also generalize the incompatibility that Keeney (1980) observes between 
catastrophe aversion and risk equity. Ex post transformed utilitarianism and prioritarianism do 
not satisfy risk equity.23 Thus there is no transformation function that will render ex post 
utilitarianism, or ex post prioritarianism, consistent with both Keeney or global catastrophe 
aversion and risk equity. 
                                                 
20 Although ex post transformed utilitarianism and prioritarianism satisfy weak catastrophe aversion with an 
appropriate transformation function, they are not necessarily catastrophe averse when individuals can vary in their 
wealth.  
21 Fleurbaey informally discusses Keeney catastrophe aversion, and suggests that it may make more sense to reduce 
an independent risk than a risk that hits everyone equally. The intuition is that, when the number of expected 
fatalities is given, one may prefer a catastrophe with a higher number of fatalities since this reduces ex post 
inequality. At the limit, if everyone will be either alive or dead, there is maximal ex post equality. 
22 As noted in Part I, where w = 
1
( )N ii g u , hEDE(w) = g-1(w/N). With g(.) strictly concave, g-1(.) is strictly convex. 
If g-1(.) is strictly convex in w/N, it is also strictly convex in w.  
23 Focusing on the case where individuals have the same wealth, let u be utility if alive and v if dead. Assume that 
there are two individuals and three states. In state 1, only individual 1 is alive; in state 2, only individual 2 is alive; 
in state 3, neither is alive. The status quo probability of state 1 is p1, and the status quo probability of state 2 is p2, 
with p2 > p1. Assume that a policy increases the probability of state 1 by ∆p and decreases the probability of state 2 
by the same amount, with p1 + ∆p < p2 − ∆p. Then risk equity requires that the policy be preferred. However, note 
that the ex post transformed utilitarian SWF assigns the status quo the value p1h(u + v) + p2h(u + v) + (1 – p1 – 
p2)h(2v). And it assigns the policy the same value, in violation of risk equity. Moreover, risk equity is violated 
regardless of the convexity or concavity of h(.).  
 The very same example shows that the ex post transformed prioritarian SWF does not satisfy risk equity. 
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 More generally, some of the policy evaluation tools considered in this article (CBA, the 
benchmark SWFs, and the ex post transformed utilitarian or prioritarian SWF) will satisfy risk 
equity, and some satisfy Keeney and global catastrophe aversion, but none satisfy both. 
PROPOSITION VII: Neither CBA, nor utilitarianism or prioritarianism (applied ex ante, 
or applied ex post with or without a transformation function), satisfy both catastrophe 
aversion and risk equity. 
 The failure of CBA to jointly satisfy these properties is, thus, a substantially more general 
feature of policy evaluation tools.  
V. Conclusion 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) evaluates the social gain from reductions in mortality risk 
using the concept of the value per statistical life (VSL). As a guide to public policy, CBA using 
VSL exhibits several properties concerning the social value of reducing mortality risk to 
different people that some commentators perceive to be undesirable, such as positive sensitivity 
to wealth and unequal value of risk reduction.  
We evaluate several prominent social welfare functions (SWFs) and find that these do not 
necessarily share the same properties as CBA. In particular, the utilitarian SWF, like CBA, 
exhibits positive wealth sensitivity; the ex post and ex ante prioritarian SWFs may or may not, 
depending on parametric assumptions. Positive sensitivity to baseline risk (the dead-anyway 
effect) is characteristic of CBA and the ex ante prioritarian SWF, but the utilitarian and ex post 
prioritarian SWFs are insensitive to baseline risk. None of the approaches value risk reductions 
equally in a population, except for the ex post prioritarian SWF under restrictive conditions. Both 
CBA and the ex ante prioritarian SWF exhibit some preference for risk equity. Neither CBA nor 
any of the three SWFs exhibit catastrophe aversion, although this property is satisfied by 
transformed versions of ex post utilitarianism and prioritarianism for appropriate transformation 
functions when individuals have equal wealth. We strengthen Keeney’s (1980) result concerning 
the impossibility of finding a policy-evaluation methodology that simultaneously satisfies risk 
equity and catastrophe aversion. 
In summary, some combinations of properties that one may find desirable in a method for 
ranking social policies can be satisfied by appropriate choice of a social welfare function, but 
others cannot (at least by the SWFs we have examined here). A preference for risk equity 
requires positive sensitivity to baseline risk and is incompatible with catastrophe aversion. It is 
interesting to note that the set of properties characteristic of CBA is not inherent to any of the 
SWFs we have considered, although it can be mimicked by ex ante prioritarianism with 
appropriate parametric assumptions. Finally, we remind the reader that we have not analyzed 
how the rank-weighted and leximin SWFs evaluate the social value of risk reduction; that is a 
topic for future research.  
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Appendix 
A. Comparing Degrees of Wealth-Sensitivity 
Consider the case in which pi = pj = p and ci > cj. The article (Part II.A.) characterized 
CBA and the benchmark SWFs as positively “wealth sensitive” in valuing individual risk 
reduction if / 1
/
i
j
W p
W p
    in this case. However, we can also compare the degree of wealth 
sensitivity of different policy-evaluation tools. Consider the four ratios, corresponding to CBA 
and the three benchmarks. Assume the standard utility model. 
Ratio 1 (CBA): 
( ) (1 ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
j ji i i
j j j i i
pu c p v cVSL u c v c
VSL u c v c pu c p v c
          
Ratio 2 (utilitarianism): / ( ) ( )
/ ( ) ( )
U
i i i
U
j j j
W p u c v c
W p u c v c
      
Ratio 3 (ex post prioritarianism): / ( ( )) ( ( ))
/ ( ( )) ( ( ))
EPP
i i i
EPP
j j j
W p g u c g v c
W p g u c g v c
      
Ratio 4 (ex ante prioritarianism): / ( ) ( ) ( ( ) (1 ) ( ))
/ ( ) ( ) ( ( ) (1 ) ( )
EAP
i i i i i
EAP
j j j j j
W p u c v c g pu c p v c
W p u c v c g pu c p u c
            
 Note that Ratio 1 and Ratio 2 are greater than unity: both CBA and utilitarian have 
positive wealth sensitivity. But note also that Ratio 1 is greater than Ratio 2 (as long as u(.) or 
v(.) or both are concave, an assumption of our standard VSL model). Thus CBA is more 
sensitive to wealth, in valuing risk reduction, than the utilitarian SWF. A given proportional 
increase in wealth (by ci/cj) produces a greater proportional increase in the social value of risk 
reduction, using CBA as the measure of social value, than if the utilitarian SWF is used as the 
measure of social value. 
Note that this comparison of ratios is an ordinal feature of CBA and the utilitarian SWF. 
If WCBA is replaced by f(WCBA) and WU by f*(WU), both f and f* strictly increasing, then Ratio 1 
remains greater than Ratio 2. 
 
Not only is CBA more wealth sensitive than utilitarianism. It is also more wealth 
sensitive than ex ante prioritarianism: Ratio 1 exceeds Ratio 4. Observe indeed that Ratio 2 
exceeds Ratio 4 and thus the result holds since Ratio 1 exceeds Ratio 2.  
 
Finally, CBA is more wealth sensitive than ex post prioritarianism with a zero bequest 
function or a non-zero bequest function and suitable restrictions on the form of g(.) and u(.). (For 
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instance, v(.) = ku(.), with 0 <k < 1 and g(x) = 
1
1
x 


 for any γ > 0, γ ≠ 1, or g(x) = log x. Under 
these restrictions, observe that Ratio 2 exceeds Ratio 3 and thus the result holds since Ratio 1 
exceeds Ratio 2.) 
 
B. Risk Equity 
1. CBA with Equivalent Variations Satisfies a Weak Preference for Risk Equity 
 Individual i has survival probability pi, individual j has survival probability pj, with pj < 
pi. Both individuals have the same wealth c. If a policy decreases i’s survival probability by ∆p 
and increases j’s by the same amount, then the individuals’ equivalent variations for the policy 
are as follows, with ∆ci < 0 and ∆cj > 0. 
(1)  u(c + ∆ci)pi + v(c + ∆ci) (1 − pi) = u(c)(pi − ∆p) + v(c)(1 −pi + ∆p) 
(2)  u(c + ∆cj)pj + v(c + ∆cj)(1− pj) = u(c)(pj + ∆p) + v(c)(1 − pj − ∆p) 
 
Equation (1) simplifies to:  
(3) [u(c) – u(c + ∆ci)]pi + [v(c) – v(c + ∆ci)](1 −pi) = [u(c) – v(c)] ∆p 
Similarly, (2) simplifies to: 
(4) [u(c + ∆cj) – u(c)]pj + [v(c + ∆cj) – v(c)](1 − pj) = [u(c) − v(c)] ∆p 
Thus: 
(5) [u(c) – u(c + ∆ci)]pi + [v(c) – v(c + ∆ci)](1 − pi) = 
  [u(c + ∆cj) – u(c)]pj + [v(c + ∆cj) − v(c)](1 − pj)  
Use the abbreviations A* to mean [u(c) – u(c + ∆ci)], B* to mean [v(c) – v(c + ∆ci)], A to mean 
[u(c + ∆cj) – u(c)] and B to mean [v(c + ∆cj) – v(c)]. 
Because u' > v', A* > B* and therefore piA* + (1 −pi)B* > pjA* + (1 −pj) B*.  
It is therefore impossible that −∆ci = ∆cj. If that were the case, we would have a contradiction. It 
would follow (given the weak concavity of u(.) and v(.)) that A* ≥ A and B* ≥B, and thus that pi 
A* + (1 − pi)B* > pjA + (1 −pj)B, i.e., the left side of equation 5 would be greater than the right. 
Note, finally, that the term piA* + (1 −pi)B*, the left side of equation 5, is decreasing in ∆ci. 
(This can be seen by differentiating that term with respect to ∆ci.) Thus, for equation (5) to hold, 
it must be that −∆ci < ∆cj, or the sum of equivalent variations is positive and risk equity 
preference holds. 
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2. CBA with Compensating Variations Can Violate a Weak Preference for Risk Equity 
 As before, let individual i have survival probability pi, and individual j survival 
probability pj, with pj < pi. Both individuals have the same wealth c. If a policy decreases i’s 
survival probability by ∆p and increases j’s by the same amount, then the individuals’ 
compensating variations for the policy are as follows, with ∆ci < 0 and ∆cj > 0. 
(1*)  u(c)pi + v(c) (1 − pi) = u(c −∆ci)(pi − ∆p) + v(c − ∆ci)(1 −pi + ∆p) 
  (2*)  u(c)pj + v(c)(1− pj) = u(c −∆cj)(pj + ∆p) + v(c − ∆cj)(1 − pj − ∆p) 
 To see a simple case where −∆ci > ∆cj and thus weak risk equity preference fails, let v(.) 
= 0, pi = 1, and pj = 0, and u(.) be the square root function. Equation (1*) simplifies to: 
 (3*) 
2
2
1 (1 )
(1 ) i
pc c
p
      
Equation (2*) simplifies to ∆cj = c. A little manipulation of (3*) shows that, if 1 1/ 2p   
.3, then −∆ci > c. 
3. Ex Ante Prioritarianism  
 In Part II.D we stated that ex ante prioritarianism satisfies a weak preference for risk 
equity. This can be easily demonstrated. Assume, as before, pi > pj and both individuals have the 
same wealth c. Assume policy a decreases i’s survival probability by ∆p and increases j’s by ∆p, 
where pj + ∆p ≤ pi − ∆p. Let Uia denote i’s expected utility for the policy, i.e., (pi − ∆p) u(c) + (1 
− pi + ∆p) v(c). Similarly, Uja = (pj + ∆p) u(c) + (1 − pj − ∆p) v(c). According to ex ante 
prioritarianism, the change in social value associated with the policy is g(Uia) + g(Uja) – g(Ui) – 
g(Uj), so the policy is preferred iff g(Uja) – g(Uj) > g(Ui) – g(Uia). Note, now, that Uja – Uj= Ui – 
Uia = ∆p [u(c) – v(c)], which is greater than zero because u(c) > v(c). Moreover, because u(c) > 
v(c) and pj + ∆p ≤ pi − ∆p, it follows that Uja ≤ Uia. Thus, by strict concavity of g(.), g(Uja) – 
g(Uj) > g(Ui) – g(Uia). 
 
In Part II.D., we also indicated that ex ante prioritarianism with a logarithmic g(.) 
function and a zero bequest function satisfies a strong preference for risk equity (i.e., even where 
the individuals don’t have the same wealth). Indeed, we then have g(Uja) – g(Uj) – g(Ui) + g(Uia) 
= log(pj + ∆p) − log pj + log(pi − ∆p) – log pi, which is always positive as soon as pj + ∆p ≤ pi − 
∆p. Nevertheless the result that ex ante prioritarianism satisfies risk equity in the strong sense 
does not extend beyond the special logarithmic case. Indeed, with a zero bequest function, the 
logarithmic function is the only strictly concave g(.) function with this property. To see that, 
observe that wealth has no effect on g(Uja) – g(Uj) for an infinitesimal ∆p only when F(c) 
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=g'(pu(c))u(c) is independent from c. We obtain F '(c) = g''(pu(c))pu'(c)u(c)+ g'(pu(c))u'(c), so 
that F'(c) = 0 for all c is equivalent to –xg''(x)/g'(x) = 1 for all x, or g(.)=log.  
C. Equal Value of Risk Reduction 
 In Part III.A., we proved that the ex post transformed utilitarian SWF does not satisfy 
equal value of risk reduction with a zero bequest function. We also indicated that this result 
generalizes to the case of a non-zero bequest function, and that the ex post transformed 
prioritarian SWF does not satisfy equal value of risk reduction. We now demonstrate these latter 
results. 
1. Ex Post Transformed Utilitarian SWF 
Assume that, in the status quo, individuals i and j are dead in both state s and state s*. 
Individual i has wealth ci and individual j wealth cj. Both states have the same probability π. 
Assume that the N – 2 individuals other than i, in state s, have total utility L. (In other words, L = 
,
[ ( ) (1 ) ( )]s sk k k k
k i j
l u c l v c

  , where skl takes the value 1 if individual k is alive in state s and 0 if 
she is dead, and ck is k’s wealth.) Similarly, assume that the N – 2 individuals other than i and j, 
in state s*, have total utility L*.  
One policy saves individual i in state s; a second policy saves individual j in state s*. 
(Thus the first policy reduces i’s fatality risk by π, and the second policy reduces j’s fatality risk 
by the same amount.) The change in social value from the first policy is: πh(L + u(ci) + v(cj)) – 
πh(L + v(ci) + v(cj)). The change in social value from the second policy is πh(L* + v(ci) + u(cj)) – 
πh(L* + v(ci) + v(cj)). 
Let u(.) and v(.) be any utility functions that satisfy the standard model. Pick cj and ci, L, 
L* so that  
(1) cj < ci and L + u(ci) + v(cj) = L* + v(ci) + u(cj)). 
(Note that it is clearly possible to do this. For example, assume that there are two other 
individuals k and m, such that ck = ci and cm = cj, and k is alive in s* and dead in s, while m is 
dead in s* and alive in s.)  
Because uʹ > vʹ by the standard model, and ci > cj, it follows that L* > L. 
 In order for ex post transformed utilitarianism to satisfy equal value of risk reduction, 
h(.), strictly increasing, must be such that  
(2) h(L + u(ci) + v(cj)) – h(L + v(ci) + v(cj)) = h(L* + v(ci) + u(cj)) – h(L* + v(ci) + v(cj)). 
 Putting (1) and (2) together, plus the fact that h(.) is strictly increasing, it follows that L = 
L*. But this is impossible, since L* > L. 
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2. Ex Post Transformed Prioritarian SWF 
  We ignore the special case where g(u(c)) – g(v(c)) is constant, so that ex post 
prioritarianism without a transformation function satisfies equal value of risk reduction. (See the 
comment in the footnote before Proposition III.) The question addressed here is whether 
introducing a transformation function enables ex post prioritarianism to satisfy equal value of 
risk reduction without these special assumptions on g(.), u() and v(.). 
 Leaving aside this special case, pick ci, cj so that g(u(ci)) – g(v(ci)) ≠ g(u(cj)) – g(v(cj)). 
As above, let states s and s* have the same probability π, and let both individuals i and j be dead 
in both states. Let L be 
,
[ ( ( )) (1 ) ( ( ))]s sk k k k
k i j
l g u c l g v c

   and define L* similarly. Arrange the 
incomes and alive/dead states of the other individuals so that L + g(u(ci)) + g(v(cj)) = L* + 
g(v(ci)) + g(u(cj)). Because g(u(ci)) – g(v(ci)) ≠ g(u(cj)) – g(v(cj)), it follows that L* ≠ L. 
 One policy saves individual i in state s, while a second saves individual j in state s*. In 
order for equal value of risk reduction to be satisfied, it must be the case that: 
h(L + g(u(ci)) + g(v(cj))) – h(L + g(v(ci)) + g(v(cj))) = h(L* + g(v(ci)) + g(u(cj))) – h(L* + g(v(ci)) 
+ g(v(cj))) 
 Because L, L* have been chosen such that L + g(u(ci)) + g(v(cj)) = L* + g(v(ci)) + g(u(cj)), 
it follows from this equation and the fact that h(.) is strictly increasing that L = L*. But this is a 
contradiction.  
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